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I

n 2010 the National Rifle Association (NRA) and its legions of gunrights
supporters were on the verge of a constitutional revolution. In a pair of
landmark decisions, 1 the Supreme Court struck down gun laws in Washington,
DC, and Chicago, bringing the longmoribund Second Amendment back from
the dead and clearing the way for a fullfrontal constitutional assault on all forms of
gun control regulation. But something strange has happened in the six years since
the Supreme Court spoke its last words about the “right to bear arms.” Instead of a
string of NRA legal victories, the expected gunrights revolution never happened,
effectively stonewalled by a group of around 800 men and women that are usually
an afterthought in most conversations about American constitutional law: lower
federalcourt judges.
As it turns out, this isn’t the first time lower courts have staged an underthe
radar constitutional rebellion by finding ways not to follow the Supreme Court’s
latest trend line. In the 10 years after the Supreme Court ordered the desegregation
of public schools in 1954, lower courts effectively made sure that Brown v. Board of
Education’s transformative potential was never realized. And, despite repeated
efforts by the Supreme Court to roll back federal legislative power during the 1990s,
lower federal courts largely disregarded the Court’s invitation to start an extended
steelcage throwdown with Congress.

THE SUPREME COURT’S POTENTIAL
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL HEROISM OR
MISCHIEF IS DEPENDENT ON A
NETWORK OF SUBTERRANEAN
LOWER-COURT JUDGES.
Yet, when it comes to constitutional scholarship from the legal academy,
lower courts remain largely overlooked and ignored. More often than not, lower
court judges are either entirely missing from accounts of American constitutional
law, or portrayed as dutiful agents of the Supreme Court, proudly displaying their
“What Would SCOTUS Do?” bumper stickers as they mindlessly enforce the

Court’s proclamations about what the Constitution means. The standard account of
how constitutional interpretation works starts looking a lot like a topdown
corporate structure that issues directives from a home office at One First Street,
which are then dutifully implemented by faceless judicial bureaucrats in faroff local
branches.
In a pair of recent articles, federal courts scholars Neil Siegel and Richard Re
try to remind us what’s lost in this act of collective academic amnesia, offering a
vision of the federal judiciary that looks less like The Office and more like Silicon
Valley: a network of interdependent nodes where messages are sent not only from
the topdown, but from the bottomup. Taken together, Siegel’s “Reciprocal
Legitimation in the Federal Courts System” 2 and Re’s “Narrowing Supreme Court
Precedent from Below” 3 offer a muchneeded antidote to our obsessive focus on
the Supreme Court, which dominates both popular and academic accounts of how
constitutional law is made.
Siegel is interested in how the Supreme Court and lower courts work together
to change what the Constitution means. His story is a baroque, threeact
collaborative drama he calls “reciprocal legitimation.” In Act One, a cautious and
insecure Supreme Court wants to move constitutional doctrine in a new direction,
but worries that it doesn’t have enough legal support to make the big leap, like a
flirtatious teenager scared to make the first move. So the Court, hearing a case that
came to it from a lower court, issues a narrow judicial opinion to send a signal to all
lower courts about where it wants the law to go. It doesn’t tell them outright; it
plants subtle messages in oral arguments, and in the opinion itself, that it’s open to
moving in a new direction. In Act Two, lower federal courts pick up on that signal,
using the Court’s narrow decision as legal support to make the broad shift the Court
itself was too scared to make, expanding the decision’s meaning well beyond
anything the Court explicitly said. Finally, in Act Three, a grateful Supreme Court
relies on these expansive lowercourt decisions as legal authority to cast the final
blow for a major change in doctrine.
Exhibit A for Siegel’s theory is samesex marriage. In Act One, the Court
ruled in United States v. Windsor 4 that the federal Defense of Marriage Act
violated the 14th Amendment. But in a moment of caution, Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s majority opinion explicitly left open the question of whether state
prohibitions on samesex marriage might also violate the 14th Amendment. In Act
Two, LGBT legal organizations immediately used Windsor to instigate a quick set
of lower court decisions overturning statelevel prohibitions, expanding Windsor’s
meaning to include a fullscale embrace of marriage equality. Finally, in Act Three,
the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges 5 relied upon this new mountain of lower court

decisions as legal authority to deliver the deathblow to all samesex marriage
prohibitions.
<i>A family in Iowa City celebrating the Supreme Court's decision
on marriage equality</i>. Photograph by Alan Light / Flickr
A family in Iowa City celebrating the Supreme Court’s decision on marriage equality. Photograph by Alan
Light / Flickr

If Siegel is focused on how judicial networks collaborate to move law in a new
direction, Richard Re is interested in how lower courts push back and limit the
Court’s power. His story involves lower court judges using ambiguity in Supreme
Court decisions to constrain the Court’s influence by “narrowing from below.” A
lower court deciding a new case that arrives after a Supreme Court decision can
decide that the Court’s legal interpretation either: 1) directly applies to the new case
and dictates an outcome, or 2) does not apply, leaving the lower court free to
resolve the case as it sees fit. By choosing Interpretation Two, lower courts have
effectively “narrowed” the meaning of the Supreme Court’s decision. They aren’t
openly defying their bosses; they’re just using ambiguity in the Court’s directives as
a cudgel to nudge constitutional law in a slightly different direction.
As one example, Re looks at how lower courts have interpreted the “right to
bear arms” and the Second Amendment. Instead of following the Supreme Court’s
lead after two major decisions striking down gun control laws, lower courts
“narrowed from below,” turning the Court’s landmark Second Amendment
decisions into a “mostly symbolic victory” for gunrights activists—by using
ambiguities in the Court’s reasoning to uphold a range of state and local gun control
laws. Re reminds us that without the cooperation of lower court judges, the
Supreme Court is definitely still a court, but something less than supreme.

LOWER COURTS AREN’T OPENLY
DEFYING THEIR BOSSES; THEY’RE
JUST USING AMBIGUITY TO NUDGE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A
SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT DIRECTION.

Taken together, Siegel’s and Re’s accounts suggest new ways of reading
Supreme Court opinions, and a more expansive vision of constitutional law as
“text.” Among its many responsibilities, the Supreme Court manages a huge
judicial bureaucracy that performs much of the daytoday grunt work of
interpreting, implementing, and enforcing the United States Constitution. This
obvious but often overlooked fact requires us to read Supreme Court opinions with
an eye toward detecting signals that the Court sends to lower courts, and toward
opportunities for discretion that might allow those courts to control the decision’s
scope. This search for signals expands the “text” of constitutional law well beyond
Supreme Court opinions, to include not only the subsequent actions of lower
courts, but also the many mechanisms that the Court might use to send such
signals: including oral arguments and a range of procedural devices to quickly affirm
—or decline to review—actions taken by lower courts.
Both articles also spotlight the ways our collective fetishization of the
Supreme Court distorts accounts of how constitutional law gets made. Over the last
15 years, constitutional scholars and popular commentators have increasingly
treated constitutional change as a highlevel conversation taking place between the
Supreme Court and public opinion, with the Court responding to actions by
political leaders or social movements while the rest of the country watches from the
sidelines. Siegel and Re explain how the entire judicial branch participates in that
story. When lower court judges “narrow” or engage in “reciprocal legitimation,”
they help change law. In turn, it’s hard not to leave these articles with a somewhat
diminished view of the Court’s power, where “the Nine’s” potential for
constitutional heroism or mischief is dependent on a network of subterranean lower
court judges with their own agendas and ideas about constitutional meaning.
Finally, Siegel and Re remind us that the act of interpreting the Constitution,
when seen from below, is more democratic than we might think. In our system, the
power to make constitutional law is diffuse: it empowers legions of federal and state
judges to make daily determinations about what the Constitution means, in
courthouses all across the country. While other legal systems—in places like
Germany, South Africa, and Columbia—give a small handful of elite judges on a
specialized court the exclusive power to say what their constitution means, ours
doesn’t. In our system, “We the People” can exercise influence over our
Constitution not simply through elections or activism or judicial appointments, but
through the actions of lower court judges, whose courtrooms expose them to the
lives and struggles of ordinary citizens on a far more frequent basis than the rarified
world inhabited by nine graduates of elite law schools that operate out of corporate
HQ in Washington, DC. When we erase lower court judges from the story of
constitutional law, we run the risk of losing ourselves in the process.
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